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This dissertation consists of three independent essays. The 
first essay analyses the relationship between Schumpeterian 
growth and subjective well-being. The second essay inves-
tigates whether more generous unemployment insurance 
(UI) leads job seekers to be more selective in the job they 
are looking for. In particular, it estimates the elasticity of the 
reservation wage and of other dimensions of job selectivity 
with respect to the potential duration of benefits. The third 
essay studies whether there remains a causal nonpecuniary 
effect of job loss on health when the income shock is well in-
sured by UI. It looks at whether exogenous job losses driven 
by establishment closures in Denmark in the 2000s had any 
effect on prescription drug purchases, doctors’ visits, hospital 
diagnoses, and mortality.
Chapter 1
Creative Destruction and Subjective Well-Being 
(coauthored with Philippe Aghion, Ufuk Akcigit, and Angus 
Deaton)
 
This chapter analyses the relationship between turnover- 
driven growth and subjective well-being (SWB). The exist-
ing empirical literature on happiness and income looks at 
how various measures of SWB relate to individual income, 
GDP per capita, or GDP growth, but without looking in 
further detail at what drives the growth process and at how 
the determinants of growth affect well-being. This paper 
provides a first attempt at filling this gap. More specifically,  
we look at how an important engine of growth—namely, 
Schumpeterian creative destruction with its resulting flow of 
entry and exit of firms and jobs—affects SWB differently for 
different types of individuals and in different types of labor 
markets. 
In the first part of the paper we develop a simple Schum-
peterian model of growth and unemployment to organize our 
thoughts and generate predictions on the potential effects of 
turnover on life satisfaction. In this model, growth results 
from quality-improving innovations. Each time a new 
innovator enters a sector, the worker currently employed in 
that sector loses her job and the firm posts a new vacancy. 
Production in the sector resumes with the new technology 
only when the firm has found a new suitable worker. Life 
satisfaction is captured by the expected discounted valuation 
of an individual’s future earnings. In the model, a higher 
rate of turnover has both direct and indirect effects on life 
satisfaction. The direct effects are that, everything else equal, 
more turnover translates into both a higher probability of 
becoming unemployed for the employed, which reduces life 
satisfaction, and a higher probability for the unemployed to 
find a new job, which increases life satisfaction. The indi-
rect effect is that a higher rate of turnover implies a higher 
growth externality and therefore a higher net present value 
of future earnings: this enhances life satisfaction. Overall, 
a first prediction of the model is that a higher turnover rate 
increases well-being more when controlling for aggregate 
unemployment than when not. A second prediction is that job 
creation increases and job destruction decreases well-being. 
A third prediction is that job destruction has a less nega-
tive effect on well-being when the unemployment benefits 
are more generous. A fourth prediction is that job creation 
increases future well-being more for more forward-looking 
individuals. 
In the second part of the paper we test the predictions of 
the model using cross-sectional metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA)-level U.S. data. To measure creative destruction we 
follow Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and use their 
measure of job turnover, defined as the job creation rate plus 
the job destruction rate. The data come from the Census 
Bureau’s Business Dynamics Statistics and are at the MSA 
level. In addition, we also use from the Census Bureau the 
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) data, 
which provide information on hires, separations, employ-
ment, and thus turnover, also at the MSA level. To measure 
SWB, we use the Cantril ladder of life from the Gallup 
Healthways Well-Being Index (Gallup), which asks individ-
uals about both current and future well-being. The Cantril 
ladder is based on the following questions: “Imagine a ladder 
with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top; 
the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you 
and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible 
life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you 
personally feel you stand at this time? And which level of 
the ladder do you anticipate to achieve in five years?” For ro-
bustness purposes, we also use the life satisfaction question 
from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System. 
We investigate whether Schumpeterian creative de-
struction affects these measures of well-being positively 
or negatively by regressing our measures of SWB on our 
creative destruction variables. The empirical analysis using 
cross-sectional MSA-level data on SWB and job turnover 
vindicates the theoretical predictions. Namely, we find that 
the effect of creative destruction on well-being is positive 
when we control for MSA-level unemployment and less so if 
we do not; the effects of job creation and job destruction on 
well-being are positive and negative, respectively; and job 
destruction has less negative effect when unemployment ben-
efits are higher. Moreover, we find some evidence that job 
creation has a more positive impact on future well-being for 
more forward-looking individuals when we use income, age, 
and education to proxy for patience. These results are not 
only consistent with the theory, but they are also remarkably 
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robust. They hold whether looking at well-being at the MSA 
level or the individual level, or whether using the Business 
Dynamic Statistics or the LEHD data to construct our proxy 
for creative destruction. 
The paper relates to two main strands of literature; first, 
to the literature on innovation-led growth, job turnover, 
and unemployment. Aghion and Howitt (1994, 1998) and 
Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) point to two opposite ef-
fects of growth on unemployment. One is a “capitalization” 
effect whereby more growth reduces the rate at which firms 
discount the future returns from creating a new vacancy: this 
effect pushes toward creating more vacancies and thus to-
ward reducing the equilibrium unemployment. The counter-
acting effect is a “creative destruction” effect whereby more 
growth implies a higher rate of job destruction, which in turn 
tends to increase the equilibrium level of unemployment. We 
contribute to this literature by looking at the counteracting 
effects of innovation-led growth on SWB. 
Second, the paper contributes to the literature on SWB. 
Despite a now large literature on self-reported well-being, 
there is no general consensus on how seriously these SWB 
measures should be taken, or on exactly what they mean. 
Indeed, some of the most exciting recent work (e.g., see 
Benjamin et al. [2012, 2014]) is investigating these funda-
mental questions. In this paper, we find that life satisfaction 
responds to the future growth prospects that are inherent 
in creative destruction, even despite the related short-run 
unemployment effects, and at the same time we provide 
some evidence of the validity and usefulness of self-reported 
well-being as a measure of expected future material well- 
being. Such findings have not been documented in the rele-
vant literature so far, and they provide further evidence of the 
usefulness of these well-being measures. 
Chapter 2
Unemployment Insurance and Reservation 
Wages: Evidence from Administrative Data 
(coauthored with Thomas Le Barbanchon and Roland 
Rathelot) 
This chapter investigates whether more generous UI 
leads job seekers to be more selective in their job search. In 
standard job search models, unemployed workers receive 
job offers that they accept if the value of the offered job is 
higher than the value of unemployment (McCall 1970). Their 
search strategy can be summarized by one key concept, the 
reservation wage, which is the lowest wage of an acceptable 
job offer. Although the reservation wage plays a central role 
in job search models, it is rarely observed. Thus, empirical 
evidence on the determinants of reservation wages, including 
key policy variables such as UI, is scarce. 
In theory, more generous UI increases the value of un-
employment, and thus also increases reservation wages. A 
recent strand of the empirical literature documents modest—
either positive or negative—UI effects on accepted wages 
(Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007; Le Barbanchon 2016; Ne-
koei and Weber 2017; Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender 
2012, 2016). However, reemployment wages are the equilib-
rium outcome of both the job seekers’ preferences and wages 
offered by employers. A vast empirical literature has docu-
mented that a more generous UI system increases the time 
that job seekers spend in nonemployment (see the review by 
Schmieder and von Wachter [2016]), which in turn tends to 
decrease their job prospects and the wages they are offered. 
This negative duration-dependence channel can come from 
skill depreciation, firms’ discrimination against long-term 
unemployed or heterogeneity. At the same time, job seekers’ 
preferences should push in the other direction. Indeed, as we 
explained, job seekers should become more selective in the 
wages they are willing to accept because staying unemployed 
is less costly when the system is more generous. These two 
offsetting effects would be consistent with modest effects 
on reemployment wages despite a strong effect of UI on job 
seekers’ preferences. To make progress on this question, we 
need both direct data on reservation wages and an exogenous 
source of variation in the generosity of UI. 
This paper takes advantage of unique administrative data 
on reservation wages and of a quasi-experimental research 
design. In France, when newly unemployed job seekers 
register at the public employment service to claim UI ben-
efits, they have to declare their reservation wage and other 
information on the job they are looking for, such as commut-
ing time/distance, desired number of hours and type of labor 
contract (temporary vs. long-term). Our main identification 
strategy relies on a reform that altered the potential benefit 
duration (PBD)—the maximum number of days of benefits—
for some claimants while leaving it unchanged for others, 
depending on their previous work tenure. Using this natural 
experiment, we compute difference-in-differences estimates 
of the elasticity of reservation wages with respect to PBD. 
Our results point to the lack of responsiveness of reservation 
wages and other dimensions of job selectivity to the potential 
duration of benefits. We obtain very similar results using an 
alternative identification strategy, based on the discontinuity 
of the PBD schedule at age 50. 
While the previous literature on reservation wages is 
based on survey data (Feldstein and Poterba 1984; Koenig, 
Manning, and Petrongolo 2014; Krueger and Mueller 2016), 
we use administrative data on reservation wages. Our data 
thus have several strengths: large sample size, no missing 
values due to nonresponse, and precise measures of UI- 
related policy variables and past labor outcomes, such as past 
tenure or past wages. The question is stated in these terms: 
“What minimum gross wage do you ask for?” We check that 
the distribution of this self-reported measure of reservation 
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wage makes sense and is correlated with sociodemographic 
characteristics in a meaningful manner, for a given pre- 
unemployment wage. Moreover, the data also enable us 
to follow workers over multiple claims so that we observe 
repeated measures of reservation wages for a given worker. 
We verify that, consistent with the theoretical definition of 
the reservation wage, claimants stating higher reservation 
wages remain unemployed for a longer time period, holding 
constant the claimants’ and the claims’ characteristics, and 
controlling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity of 
claimants (fixed effects models). This first result confirms 
that the reservation wage stated by claimants to the UI  
agency is meaningful. 
Our main identification strategy relies on a UI reform, 
which occurred in 2009. The reform was not triggered by 
the Great Recession. Its main objective was to simplify the 
rules according to which the potential duration of benefits 
is computed. In France, PBD is mainly determined by the 
claimant’s previous work duration. Before the 2009 reform, 
PBD was a step function of past tenure. The 2009 reform 
simplified the rule and made it linear, entitling claimants to 
as many days of benefits as days of work in the previous two 
years. The overall generosity of the system was not affected, 
but some tenure groups benefited from the reform while oth-
ers lost. Some tenure groups were unaffected and can be used 
as control groups in a difference-in-differences setting. 
Whatever the statistical specification we use, we cannot 
reject that the elasticity of reservation wages with respect 
to PBD is zero at the 5 percent level. Our results are very 
precise and, in our favorite specification, rule out elasticities 
greater than 0.006: a 10 percent increase in potential benefit 
duration cannot trigger an increase of the reservation wage of 
more than 0.06 percent. The elasticity of the actual duration 
of benefits with respect to PBD, estimated at 0.3, is in line 
with most results of the literature. Importantly, we also find 
that more generous benefits slow down job finding, even 
at the beginning of the spell when claimants declare their 
reservation wages. 
Looking at other dimensions of job selectivity, we do not 
find any significant effect of PBD on the maximum commut-
ing time/distance that job seekers are willing to accept. Nor 
do we find any effect of PBD on the number of hours or on 
the type of contract job seekers are looking for. The absence 
of responsiveness in all dimensions of job selectivity is a 
strong result. While the nonresponsiveness of reservation 
wages could have been explained by strong wage rigidity 
and low mobility across jobs, the fact that the willingness 
to find open-ended contracts and to ensure that job security 
does not change with PBD suggests that rigid labor markets 
are unlikely to be the only explanation to our results. 
While the elasticity of reservation wages is zero on 
average, we find that it amounts to a significant 0.01 for job 
seekers with the lowest past tenure. These job seekers are 
entitled to short PBD, and the date when their benefits could 
elapse is close to their registration date, when they declare 
their reservation wages. Consistently, we also find that the 
elasticity of actual benefit duration is higher for these short 
tenure claimants. We do not find any significant heterogene-
ity of the PBD elasticity of reservation wages across gender 
or past wage groups. 
We can check the robustness of our main results using 
another identification strategy, a Regression Discontinuity 
Design (RDD). When an unemployed worker is over 50 
years old at the separation date from his previous employer, 
he benefits from more generous PBDs, which are on average 
30 percent longer. We find some manipulation of the sepa-
ration date around the 50-year-old cutoff. Consequently, we 
adopt a “donut” RDD strategy, which excludes observations 
in a window around the cutoff of the running variable. As 
with our main difference-in-differences strategy, we cannot 
reject that the PBD elasticity of reservation wages is equal to 
zero, while the elasticity of actual benefit duration is around 
0.2. Claimants in the RDD strategy are different from those 
of the difference-in-differences; in particular, they are more 
attached to the labor force and older, yet results are very 
similar. 
Lastly, we discuss the theoretical relation between the 
elasticities of unemployment duration and the reservation 
wage with respect to PBD. In partial equilibrium, we can 
decompose the elasticity of unemployment duration into two 
components: one due to the elasticity of the reservation wage 
(scaled by the slope of the wage offer distribution taken at 
the level of the reservation wage) and the other one due to 
the elasticity of the job offer arrival rate (or search effort). 
Taking the upper bound of the 95 percent confidence interval 
of the estimate of the reservation wage elasticity, we find that 
the reservation wage margin accounts, at most, for 6 percent 
of the elasticity of unemployment duration, the rest being 
attributed to the elasticity of search effort. 
Our paper is, to the best of our knowledge, the first one 
to obtain precise quasi-experimental estimates of the effect 
of more generous UI on self-reported reservation wages and 
other dimensions of job selectivity. Most previous contri-
butions could not rely on credible exogenous variations in 
UI generosity and find mixed results. Feldstein and Poterba 
(1984) find a large elasticity of reservation wages to benefit 
levels, while Krueger and Mueller (2016) cannot reject that 
this elasticity is equal to zero.
As I mentioned, our findings on reservation wage respon-
siveness shed light on the current debate on the effect of UI 
on accepted wages. Our results show that changes in PBD 
have no significant effect on job selectivity at the begin-
ning of the job-search spell for the average job seeker. The 
absence of selectivity effect is in line with the conclusion of 
Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2016) that reservation 
wages are not binding in Germany. When we focus on job 
seekers with short potential benefit duration, who are more 
comparable to claimants in the Austrian sample of Nekoei 
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and Weber (2017), we find an estimate of the elasticity of 
reservation wages around 0.01, which has a magnitude 
similar to the estimate Nekoei and Weber (2017) find on the 
elasticity of accepted wages with respect to PBD (0.016). 
Our results have some policy implications. The Great 
Recession has revived a debate about how UI should react to 
an increase in the unemployment rate. Increasing potential 
benefit duration improves the insurance provided to workers 
facing more instability but bears the cost of lengthening non-
employment duration. These benefits and costs may weigh 
differently in good and bad times. Part of the literature argues 
that UI should be countercyclical, which is more generous in 
crisis times (Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2016; Marinescu 
2017). Others suggest that increasing the generosity during 
bad times amplifies the crisis by pushing job seekers to be 
more selective: the cost of labor increases and the number 
of jobs further shrinks (Hagedorn et al. 2013). The evidence 
we bring does not support this last argument. If job seekers 
are not pickier when they are more protected, increasing the 
generosity of UI during crises should not lead to any substan-
tial loss of jobs. 
Chapter 3
The Causal Effect of Job Loss on Health: The 
Danish Miracle? 
The third and last chapters study the causal effect of job 
loss on health. Job loss can affect health both through the in-
come shock and through nonpecuniary channels like the loss 
of self-esteem or the loss of a structured schedule. I investi-
gate whether there is still a causal effect of job loss on health 
in a setting where the unemployment risk is well-insured by 
policy through generous UI, active labor market policies, 
and public health insurance with universal coverage. Using 
Danish administrative data and a difference-in-differences 
design, I compare the health of roughly 25,000 high-tenure 
workers who are at an establishment that closes between 
2001 and 2006 to that of a control group of workers matched 
on observables who do not experience a closure. I find that in 
such a setting job losses do not cause large significant effects 
on health, whether looking at mental health proxies such as 
antidepressant purchases, severe physical health outcomes 
that require inpatient care, or mortality. I can rule out effect 
on most health outcomes of the order of 1 or 2 percent. For 
mortality I can rule out effects of 15 percent. My results 
taken together with prior literature suggest that it is possible, 
presumably through an adequate set of policies, to make the 
causal effect of job loss on health negligible. 
The seminal work in sociology on the unemployed 
community of Marienthal, a small town in Austria where the 
main factory closed in 1930 and left many people unem-
ployed for a long time, shows how desperate the unemployed 
and their families can become and the many dimensions in 
life that can be affected, from standards of living to the loss 
of a sense of purpose or of a social identity (Lazarsfeld, Ja-
hoda, and Zeisel 1933). Fortunately, since the Great Depres-
sion, developed countries have implemented some policies to 
alleviate the burden of unemployment, particularly UI. But 
job loss might also entail some nonpecuniary aspects against 
which policy cannot provide insurance. 
This paper investigates whether there remains a causal 
effect of job loss on health, particularly mental health and 
substance abuse, in a setting where UI is generous, active 
labor market policies are available, and health insurance is 
universal. The identification strategy relies on establishment 
closures, which lead to job losses that are arguably exoge-
nous to employees’ health. The context is that of Denmark 
after the implementation of flexicurity policies. The replace-
ment rate of UI is 90 percent (with a cap, which in 2015 was 
roughly equivalent to US$628 per week), and the maximum 
potential duration of unemployment benefits, though it has 
been gradually reduced, remains long: four years during 
2001–2010, the relevant period for this study. Active labor 
market policies are in place since 1994. Moreover, health 
insurance is publicly provided with universal coverage. 
Using a difference-in-differences design and Danish 
administrative data, I compare the health of roughly 25,000 
workers who experience an establishment closure to that of a 
control group matched on observables. I find that on average 
in Denmark, job losses due to establishment closures that oc-
curred between 2001 and 2006 did not cause large significant 
health problems. 
I focus on people strongly attached to their jobs: my 
sample consists of men and women aged 25–60 who have at 
least five years of tenure at their establishment; 25 percent 
of my treatment group goes through a period of unemploy-
ment in the year of the closure, as opposed to 4 percent in the 
control group. They are also more likely to leave the labor 
force. However, despite a long-lasting effect on their wage 
earnings, they experience only a 6 percent drop in post-
tax, posttransfer household income. In terms of health, the 
treatment group is not significantly more likely to purchase 
antidepressants or other antianxiety drugs, which I use as a 
proxy for mental health. I can rule out effects on the order of 
2 percent. I do not observe any change in their regular health 
care consumption, such as the number of visits to the General 
Practitioner, or any effect on severe physical health outcomes 
that requires inpatient care at the hospital, for which I can 
rule out, respectively, effects of the order of 1 and 4 percent. 
Mortality is also not significantly affected. The two excep-
tions for which I find a marginally significant effect are visits 
to the hospital for alcohol issues, but results are not very 
precisely estimated, as well as purchases of diabetes-related 
drugs, which may well be a false positive. 
This paper is related to several lines of research. The most 
closely related papers, which I discuss in further detail in 
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the paper, are those looking at the effect of mass layoffs or 
plant closures on some health outcomes. Results from this 
literature are mixed: while some papers find strong effects, 
especially on mortality for males (Browning and Heinesen 
2012; Eliason and Storrie 2009a; Rege, Telle, and Votruba 
2009; Sullivan and Von Wachter 2009), others find a rela-
tively precise zero (Browning, Dano, and Heinesen 2006; 
Kuhn, Lalive, and Zweimuller 2009). Part of the variety of 
the results comes from differences in the precise definition 
of the treatment and of the control groups as well as sample 
restrictions and outcomes of interest (for instance, many 
papers focus on mortality for males, and although I do find 
positive point estimates for mortality for males, they are not 
significant or large) or on some methodological differences 
(whether one includes the deaths that occur in the year of 
displacement can make a difference).1 But another part pre-
sumably has to do with the fact that the effect of job loss on 
health depends on the institutional context, and it is hard to 
compare results across countries. 
I contribute to the literature by looking at a wide set of 
health outcomes with a long period of observation, which 
allows me to give a comprehensive picture. Moreover, I am 
able to provide direct visual evidence that the treatment and 
control groups were on parallel trends in terms of health in 
the five years before the job loss shock. I interpret my results 
as showing that it is possible, presumably through an ade-
quate set of policies, to make the causal effect of job loss on 
health very small, if not negligible. 
The paper also relates to work on unemployment and 
subjective well-being (Winkelmann and Winkelmann 1998). 
This literature has shown that unemployment is associated 
with lower subjective well-being. My paper adds to this 
literature by focusing on job losses that are arguably exog-
enous and by aiming at capturing more objective but also 
more severe health conditions. Unemployment may well lead 
to lower satisfaction in Denmark as well, but if it is not to the 
point that people start taking antidepressants or find them-
selves to be in worse health, it may not require any further 
involvement from policy. 
This paper also relates to work on income-health gradi-
ents, particularly recent work by Cesarini et al. (2016) on 
the causal effect of wealth on health and child development 
in Sweden. They find that an exogenous increase in wealth 
(from winning a lottery) has no overall effect on health, nei-
ther on mortality nor on health care utilization. This evidence 
is totally in line with what I find: nowadays in Scandinavian 
countries, the cross-sectional association between health and 
economic variables seems mostly driven by selection. 
Finally, the paper can relate to rising concerns in the Unit-
ed States about addiction to painkillers and the increase in 
mortality from poisoning, suicide, and alcohol-related deaths 
highlighted by Case and Deaton (2015). Data from the Inter-
national Narcotics Control Board show that Denmark also 
experienced rising trends in painkillers consumption. My 
data allow me to test whether job loss makes people more 
likely to develop addiction to such substances, to engage in 
excessive alcohol drinking, or to commit suicide. Despite a 
strong association in the cross-section between unemploy-
ment and purchases of opioid painkillers, I do not find any 
effect on such purchases following an exogenous layoff. 
Note
1. As I show in the paper, there is a strong significant difference 
in death hazard of treatment vs. control group in the year of 
displacement, but some of these deaths could be the cause of 
the establishment closure rather than caused by the closure. This 
reverse causality concern seems more relevant because the dif-
ference is entirely driven by the smallest establishments. Thus, 
though I show results both with and without the deaths of year 
0, my preferred estimates are, as in Sullivan and von Wachter 
(2009), the ones that focus on deaths that occurred from year 
one onward.
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